In the end, the French insistence, faithfully supported by the American authorities, was required for the agreements to be implemented immediately after an agreement was finally reached. In order to solve the problem of gold purchases by central banks, the Bank for International Settlements, which is not bound by the Fund`s statutes, has been listed as an intermediary in the purchase and sale of gold. However, the BIS has stated that it has no intention of buying gold on its own behalf and it is not yet entirely certain that early implementation will not lead to difficulties or protests by Congress, which was particularly vulnerable last year, to scrupulous adherence to its prerogatives.29 The Jamaican agreement is therefore not the beginning of a new era. If so, it is the end of an effort that began with high hopes and ended with rather modest results, i.e. makeshift provisions for the most pressing problems during an „intermediate period“. But while the reconstruction of a rational monetary system must wait another day, such construction must come from some important elements that have been introduced. The finance ministers of the United States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan reached an agreement on the latter agreements on the presidential yacht Sequoia on 30 August 1975. It is essentially identical to the agreement reached by the EEC ministers in the spring of 1974 in Zeist (Netherlands). The U.S. defense of the agreement is that the U.S. power to push for the renewal of the non-pegging agreement will, in two years, be as strong as it was at the same time; and secondly, that it would be very risky anyway for some European central banks to flood the price of gold in the face of strong opposition from the United States.
Indeed, a low-priced commitment could soon put the new price under speculative market pressure, while a high-priced commitment could see the United States gradually sell its gold to European central banks on the most advantageous terms. Below, I propose to deal successively (1) with the tensions that have developed within the Bretton Woods system and why it was broken; (2) the reform efforts that followed and why they failed; (3) the Jamaican agreement and its importance; (4) Where and how to go. First, the Ministers finally acknowledged that the international monetary agreements had indeed made fundamental changes and based their agreements on the real situation and not on what they hoped for in the future.